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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 5, 1983, Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez arrived
at Los Angeles International Airport after a ten-hour flight from
Bogota, Colombia.' After examining her passport and the contents
of her valise, customs officials detained de Hernandez on the
grounds that she fit the profile2 of a "balloon swallower."' 3 A female
customs inspector then subjected de Hernandez to a patdown and
strip search. Though the search did not reveal any contraband, the
inspectress noted that de Hernandez had on two pairs of paper
towel-lined underpants and that her stomach felt firm and full.
The inspectress reported her findings to the inspector in charge.
The inspector then told de Hernandez that he suspected she was
smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. Customs officials gave de
1. Respondent passed through immigration and proceeded to customs because her visa
was in order. 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3306 (1985).
2. de Hernandez recently had made at least eight trips to either Miami or Los Angeles.
She spoke no English and had no friends or relatives in the United States. She also had
made no hotel reservations. Moreover, respondent told the customs agents that she planned
to buy merchandise for her husband's store in BogotA, although, she had no appointments
and carried no checks, credit cards, waybills or letters of credit. She did possess $5,000, most
of which was in $50 bills. Id. at 3307.
3. A "balloon swallower" is one who attempts to smuggle narcotics by ingesting narcotic
filled balloons into the alimentary canal.
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Hernandez three choices: (1) return to Colombia on the next avail-
able flight; (2) agree to an x-ray examination; or (3) remain in de-
tention until she produced a monitored bowel movement that
would confirm or rebut the inspectors' suspicions. De Hernandez
chose to return to Colombia and was placed in a room, under ob-
servation, to await the next flight. The officials told her that if she
went to the toilet she would have to use a waste basket so that her
feces could be inspected for balloons or capsules containing narcot-
ics.4 De Hernandez remained in the observation room for the rest
of the night. During this time officials tried to place her on a Mexi-
can airline that was flying to Bogota via Mexico City the next
morning. De Hernandez, however, was not permitted on the flight
because she lacked a Mexican visa necessary to land in that coun-
try. The officials then told her that she was not free to leave and
that they would detain her until she consented to an x-ray exami-
nation or submitted to a monitored bowel movement. She did not
consent 6
After sixteen hours, de Hernandez had neither defecated nor
agreed to an x-ray examination. At that point the customs agents
sought a court order permitting a physician to conduct a preg-
nancy test along with an x-ray and rectal examination. Eight hours
later the agents obtained the order and procured a physician to
perform the examinations.' During the rectal examination, the
physician discovered a cocaine-filled balloon. The customs agents
immediately placed de Hernandez under arrest. During the ensu-
ing four days, respondent passed eighty-eight cocaine-filled
balloons.
The district court denied de Hernandez's motion to suppress
the cocaine and a jury convicted her of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute,7 and importation of cocaine.8 The United
4. The officials refused respondent's request to make a telephone call. de Hernandez,
105 S. Ct. at 3307.
5. During this time, de Hernandez remained in detention and under observation. She
declined offers of food and drink and refused to use the toilet facilities. The Ninth Circuit
noted that respondent appeared to have symptoms of discomfort associated with "heroic
efforts to resist the usual calls of nature." Montoya de Hernandez v. United States, 731 F.2d
1369, 1371 (9th Cir. 1984).
6. The order instructed the physician to honor respondent's claim of pregnancy. The
respondent took a pregnancy test, the results of which turned out negative. The rectal ex-
amination, however, was conducted before the results of the pregnancy test were known. 105
S. Ct. at 3308.
7. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).
8. 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a) (1982).
[Vol. 17:3
MONTOYA DE HERNANDEZ
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that the sixteen-hour detention violated respondent's fourth
amendment rights." The Ninth Circuit asserted that a justifiably
high level of official skepticism existed as to respondent's good
faith as a tourist. The court reasoned that it took customs officals
more than sixteen hours to feel confident that they could obtain a
search warrant. Thus, the customs officials did not have a "clear
indication"1 of alimentary canal smuggling at the inception of the
detention." The United States Supreme Court held, reversed: A
detention of an incoming traveler at the border which exceeds the
scope of a routine customs search and inspection is justified at its
inception if customs officials, considering all of the facts surround-
ing the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is
smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal. United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, rev'g, 731 F.2d 1369
(1985).
Balancing the fourth amendment proscription against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures with the governmental interest of
protecting the integrity of the border, the de Hernandez Court
confronted the issue of what level of suspicion is necessary to jus-
tify a seizure of an incoming traveler for purposes other than a
routine border search. In determining that "reasonable suspicion"
satisfies the fourth amendment reasonableness requirements, the
de Hernandez Court focused on three factors: (1) the governmen-
tal interest in protecting the border;"'(2) the difficulty in detecting
alimentary canal smugglers;' 3 and(3) the "veritable national crisis"
in law enforcement caused by narcotics smuggling.14 The Court
was quick to adopt the intermediate, and often arbitrary, standard
of "reasonable suspicion" in this case, and was also quick to dis-
card the "clear indication" standard.
1
5
9. 105 S. Ct. at 1373.
10. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1960) (officials must have a clear
indication of possession of narcotics before a search may be made).
11. The court noted that if the facts apparent upon arrival would not authorize issu-
ance of a warrant, then it would be difficult to hold that these same facts authorize the long
period of detention which eventually did produce some additional evidence in support of a
warrant. 731 F.2d at 1372.
12. 105 S. Ct. at 3309.
13. Id. at 3312.
14. Id. at 3309.
15. The Court discards "clear indication" as a standard so that case results may be
facilitated where paramount policy interests exist. In support of this rejection, the Court
asserts that "subtle verbal gradations may obscure rather than elucidate the meaning of the
provision in question." Id. at 3311. It seems improbable, however, that less obscurity will
1986]
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II. PRIOR FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
An historical examination of detention cases serves as a frame-
work for understanding the problems the Supreme Court faced in
de Hernandez. This Comment will focus on the Ninth Circuit's os-
cillation between competing standards of reasonableness, as well as
seminal Supreme Court detention cases.
In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio,'16 the Supreme Court
grappled with the meaning of the word 'seizure' as stated in the
fourth amendment.17 The Court held that a seizure exists when-
ever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
to walk away.' 8 The Court held further that a police officer may, in
certain circumstances, approach a person for purposes of investiga-
tion though no probable cause exists to make an arrest. In Terry,
where the officer had conducted a patdown search to determine if
the defendant was armed, the Court upheld a brief detention of
the defendant.' 9 To justify the particular detention, however, the
police officer must be able to show specific and articulable facts,
which taken together with rational inferences therefrom, reasona-
bly warrant the detention.20 The Court pointed out that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant requirement."s The
Court also noted that the validity of the "stop and frisk" was pred-
icated on the officer's need for personal security.
2"
The Terry Court determined the reasonableness of the deten-
result by rejecting a third standard, when the alternative standards, "reasonable suspicion"
and "probable cause," certainly lack definition and are thus obscure as well.
16. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17. Terry was an action by the state against a pedestrian for carrying a concealed
weapon.
18. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
19. The Court stated that it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language
to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his
or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a search. Moreover, it is simply fantastic to
urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands
helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a "petty indignity." It is a serious
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and is not to be undertaken lightly. Id. at 16-17.
20. Id. at 21. The Court stated that the search must be "strictly tied to and justified
by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. The Court also stated that
a detention which is reasonable at its inception may violate the fourth amendment by virtue
of its intolerable intensity and scope.
21. Id. at 20.
22. Id. at 21.
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tion by applying the balancing test announced in Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court.2 3 In Camara, the State brought criminal charges
against a tenant for violating a housing code provision which per-
mitted a warrantless search of the premises.24 The Court held that
administrative searches constitute a significant intrusion into the
interests which the fourth amendment protects. Such searches,
when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack
the traditional safeguards which the fourth amendment guarantees
to the individual, and, therefore are unreasonable.2 5 In cases where
the fourth amendment requires that a search warrant be obtained,
the probable cause standard is used to determine whether a partic-
ular decision to search meets the constitutional mandate of reason-
ableness. 26 To apply this standard, the governmental interest in ef-
fecting a seizure must be balanced against the intrusion into the
individual's fourth amendment rights.27
A. Border Searches in the Ninth Circuit
As far back as 1966, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit applied this balancing test to border searches. In
Blefare v. United States," the court upheld a search where offi-
cials inserted a tube into the stomach of two defendants in order to
induce vomiting. 29 The defendants vomited packets of heroin. The
court opined that the induced vomiting was neither shocking nor
23. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
24. Id. at 525.
25. Id. at 534.
26. Id.
27. In Camara, the law enforcement interest of housing code enforcement was weighed
against the violation of fourth amendment rights that occurs when a warrantless inspection
is conducted. The Court proffered that, unfortunately, there can be no ready test for deter-
mining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails. Id. at 536-37.
28. 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966). It is noteworthy that the decision in this case precedes
both Camara and Terry.
29. The defendants drove across the California border from Mexico and were detained
after an informant notified officials that they might be smuggling narcotics. Officials knew
that Blefare had crossed the border five weeks earlier and had been searched without re-
sults, and that he stated that at that time he had heroin in his stomach. The officials knew
that both defendants were addicts. Blefare was also suspected of smuggling drugs into Ca-
nada. Moreover, Blefare told the officials, after being detained, that his co-defendant had
heroin in his stomach. The officials saw Blefare vomit and reswallow an object. The officials
also justified the search on the grounds that needle marks were found on the defendants'
arms. Id. at 874.
1986] 613
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unreasonable. The court, citing Witt v. United States,"0 stated
that
no question of whether there is probable cause for a search ex-
ists when the search is incidental to the crossing of an interna-
tional border, for there is reason and probable cause to search
every person entering the United States from a foreign country,
by reason of such entry alone. That the customs authorities do
not search every person crossing the border does not mean they
have waived their right to do so, when they see fit.3'
Quoting language from Rochin v. California,32 the court asserted
that it would "shock" the conscience of law abiding citizens if the
officers, with the knowledge that these officers had, were frustrated
in the recovery and use of this evidence.33
In Rivas v. United States,3 4 which was decided exactly five
months after Blefare, the Ninth Circuit again upheld a rectal
search of the defendant. The court found that a "clear indica-
tion"3 existed that the defendant was under the influence of nar-
cotics and was suspected of attempting to smuggle narcotics into
the country.3 6 The court stressed that national security considera-
tions require that citizens be protected from wholesale introduc-
tion of narcotic drugs into this country.-7 The court, in attempting
to balance the governmental interest in apprehending drug smug-
glers with the protections afforded by the fourth amendment,
leaned towards the side of government. In 1970, however, the pen-
dulum swung back once again.
30. 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1961).
31. Blefare, 362 F.2d at 874.
32. 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (evidence was illegally obtained by forcing the defendant to
swallow an emetic solution. The Court concluded that this is conduct that shocks the
conscience).
33. Evidently, the court in Blefare tortured the concept established in Rochin so that
unpalatable police conduct could be upheld.
34. 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966).
35. Id. at 710. The court cited Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) for the
proposition that officials must have a clear indication of the possession of narcotics before a
border search may be made. In Rivas, the court stated that an intrusion beyond the body's
surface required a clear indication or plain suggestion. Rivas, 368 F.2d at 710.
36. At the border, the defendant presented customs officials with a registration certifi-
cate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1407. This statute was repealed on October 26, 1970. The pur-
pose of this statute was to make a classification of persons who were narcotic prone so that
customs officials could be on notice when these persons crossed the border. After presenta-
tion of this certificate, officials found other characteristics that suggested defendant was a
drug smuggler; fresh needle marks on defendant's arms and defendant's nervous appear-
ance. Rivas, 368 F.2d at 705.
37. 368 F.2d at 711.
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In United States v. Guadalupe-Garza,3 8 the court held that
heroin recovered from the defendant was the result of an illegal
search, where the only external signs of suspicious behavior were
the defendant's nervousness and needle marks found on his arm.39
The court, in this case, applied the "real suspicion" standard. 0
This standard requires a customs official to have at least a real
suspicion directed specifically to that person in order to sustain
such a search of the defendant."' The Court stated:
"Real suspicion" justifying the initiation of a strip search is
subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts
that would reasonably lead an experienced, prudent customs of-
ficial to suspect that a particular person seeking to cross our
border is concealing something on his body for the purpose of
transporting it into the States contrary to law.
4
1
In Guadalupe-Garza, the weight of the court's balancing test
landed on the side of the individual. The court refused to uphold a
search where the articulable facts (the defendant's nervousness
and needle marks) did not bear some reasonable relationship to
suspicious behavior.
In 1973, the court vacillated again, finding a valid search in
two cases; United States v. Holtz" and United States v. Almeida-
Sanchez.44 In Holtz, the court reiterated the "real suspicion" stan-
dard espoused in Guadalupe-Garza. The court held that only a
real suspicion was necessary to search the defendant at the bor-
der,4" where she was commanded to spread her buttocks. As a re-
38. 421 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1970).
39. Id. at 879-80. Defendant acted suspiciously and officials subjected him to a strip
search but no contraband was found. After defendant was taken to a hospital and adminis-
tered emetics, however, he vomited two balloons of heroin. Id. at 877.
40. The de Hernandez Court refused to recognize real suspicion as a standard. 105 S.
Ct. 3304.
41. Gaudalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d at 876 (citing Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d
805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967)).
42. 421 F.2d at 879. The Ninth Circuit also asserted that the objective, articulable facts
must bear some reasonable relationship to suspicion that something is concealed on the
body of the person to be searched; otherwise, the scope of the search is not related to the
justification for its initiation, as it must be to meet the reasonableness standard of the
fourth amendment. Id. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
43. 479 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973).
44. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
45. The female defendant had crossed the border in an automobile with two male com-
panions. At the port of entry officials became suspicious when the three seemed unkempt,
anxious, and uneasy. Thereafter, the three individuals were searched. Fresh needle marks
were found on the men. The two men then were strip searched, but no contraband was
19861 615
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sult of the search, the inspectress found a narcotic-filled prophy-
lactic suspended from the defendant's vaginal area. The search was
held valid in this case' 6 based on articulable facts that related to
suspicious behavior: two of the defendant's companions appeared
nervous and had fresh needle marks on their arms. The same ar-
ticulable facts in Guadalupe-Garza, however, did not give rise to
suspicious behavior. Moreover, in Guadalupe-Garza, the defend-
ant exhibited the needle marks and the nervous behavior, not two
of his companions.
Based on the cases examined thus far, it is important to note
that the court seems to have manipulated the facts to justify an
often contradictory conclusion. In Guadalupe-Garza the facts
would seem to allow a valid search; the defendant exhibited needle
marks. Whereas in Holtz the facts giving rise to a search of the
defendant were not based on the defendant, but on two of her
traveling companions. However, the court in Holtz found a valid
search.
Initially, in United States v. Almeida-Sanchez,"7 the Ninth
Circuit held that a warrantless roving border search was constitu-
tional.48 On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed. The Court held that a warrantless search of an
automobile, made by a roving patrol without probable cause or
consent, violates the fourth amendment right to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures.49 By overruling the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Almeida-Sanchez Court established that the governmen-
tal interest in deterring the unlawful entry of aliens does not
outweigh the violation of fourth amendment rights that occurs
when a vehicle is stopped without a warrant or probable cause.
Chronologically, the next decision involving border searches
was United States v. Ortiz. 0 In Ortiz the Ninth Circuit followed
found. The officers then strip searched Holtz. Holtz, 479 F.2d at 91.
46. It is noteworthy that Judge Ely, of the Ninth Circuit, dissents in this case, where an
intrusive search was upheld, as well as in Blefare, where another bodily search was upheld.
Judge Ely concurred in the result in Guadalupe-Garza, however, where an intrusive bodily
search was held unlawful.
47. 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971).
48. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
49. The defendant was stopped in California by a roving border patrol, about 25 miles
north of the Mexican border. The roving border patrol served to apprehend illegal aliens.
Subsequent to the stop, the border patrol discovered a large quantity of illegally imported
marijuana in the defendant's automobile. Id. at 267, 268.
50. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
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the dictates of the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez, when it
held a border search invalid." On appeal, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ortiz. The Ortiz Court set
forth the same reasoning for its decision as it had stated in Al-
meida-Sanchez. The Court asserted that travelers have a constitu-
tional right to be free from warrantless roving stops conducted
without consent or probable cause. In two subsequent decisions,
however, the Ninth Circuit found that the respective searches did
not violate the fourth amendment. United States v. Ek"2 and
United States v. Couch5 3 involved the same incident, but the two
men, who were arrested following a border search, were tried sepa-
rately. In Ek,54 the court rearticulated the "clear indication
55
standard 6 using it as the basis for upholding the search. In Couch,
the court first relied on United States v. Ramsey 57 and held that
persons entering the country are subject to routine searches with-
out probable cause. In addition, the court then held that a border
detention of a suspect, pending procurement of a warrant does not
violate the suspect's fourth amendment rights. Apparently, follow-
ing the Ek and Couch decisions, the Court favored governmental
concerns rather than individual right concerns. The pendulum,
however, did not remain motionless for long.
One year later, in United States v. Quintero-Castro,5a the
Ninth Circuit held that an x-ray examination violated the defend-
ant's fourth amendment rights. The defendant exhibited nervous
behavior and had other characteristics of drug smugglers.59 Never-
theless, the court found that no "clear indication" existed that
would support issuance of an order to conduct an x-ray examina-
tion. The court's oscillation continued, this time, in the same year.
51. Ortiz involved the illegal transportation of aliens, not drug smuggling.
52. 676 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1982).
53. 688 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1982).
54. The defendant, along with Couch, was detained at Los Angeles International Air-
port when a customs inspector suspected the two men of smuggling narcotics. The customs
officials were acting upon a confidential informant's tip that the two men were smuggling
narcotics. A court-ordered x-ray examination revealed that the two men had ingested nar-
cotics. Couch, 688 F.2d at 609.
55. See Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966).
56. It is notable that the court uses the word standard to explain clear indication. The
de Hernandez Court refrained from identifying clear indication as a standard.
57. 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
58. 705 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1983).
59. The defendant was travelling from a drug source country and had relatives in town
but had planned to stay at a hotel. Quintero-Castro, 705 F.2d at 1100.
19861
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In United States v. Mendez-Jimenez,60 the Ninth Circuit,
once again, favored governmental concerns. The court held that
the detention and search of defendant was reasonable. The defend-
ant was carrying an anti-diarrhea medication and had consumed
no food or drink since before leaving Colombia. Furthermore, the
defendant had no relatives in the United States and his passport
reflected tampering. The court reasserted that the "clear indica-
tion" standard supported its holding. 1 The court also justified its
holding by noting that there was a strong public interest in appre-
hending drug smugglers.62
Finally, in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,3 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that customs officials
did not have a "clear indication" that defendant was smuggling
narcotics in her alimentary canal. The resulting detention, there-
fore, was unreasonably long and violated the defendant's fourth
amendment rights. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with
the lower court's holding.
A survey of the Ninth Circuit cases suggests that the court is
attempting to reconcile the often-conflicting societal goals of pro-
tecting individuals from invasions of privacy, with allowing the
government an effective means to detect and deter criminal activ-
ity. Although the fourth amendment 6 generally requires that
probable cause be established for all arrests and searches, a war-
rant need not always be procured before an arrest or search is con-
ducted. As a result, exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as
the "stop and frisk" exception 65 and regulatory searches,66 have
been established because of certain exigent circumstances.6 7 These
60. 709 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1983).
61. Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F.2d at 1304. The facts of this case and the facts of Quintero-
Castro are quite similar, however, the court decides this case differently.
62. Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F.2d at 1304.
63. 731 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1984).
64. The fourth amendment provides, "[tihe right of people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath of Affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65. Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
66. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
67. Such exigent circumstances include preventing harm to police officers - as in the
stop and frisk exception - and preventing the imminent destruction of evidence - as in
the regulatory exception. Other exceptions include Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967)(hot pursuit); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)(plain view); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)(automobile searches).
[Vol. 17:3
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limited exceptions have been carved out of the general rule of
probable cause, because obtaining a warrant in these situations is
either not feasible or counterproductive. These limited intrusions,
however, in the absence of probable cause, must nonetheless be
reasonable. The requirement of reasonableness in these limited cir-
cumstances ensures that the balance between the interests of gov-
ernment and those of the individual will not shift too far towards
the side of government. Unfortunately, however, the line of cases
beginning with Terry and ending with de Hernandez, have evinced
a gradual, inexorable, and indeed regrettable emasculation of the
requirement of probable cause.
B. Seminal Supreme Court Cases Concerning the Fourth
Amendment
Before Terry, only seizures based on probable cause were held
to satisfy the fourth amendment. The eschewing of probable cause
in Terry was predicated on the notion that certain exigent circum-
stances-in this case the need to act quickly and to protect the
officer-warrant a limited privacy intrusion. The Court was nota-
bly circumspect, however, in narrowing its holding to the facts.
The Court was concerned that the stop and frisk exception might
be broadened and allowed to swallow the general rule of probable
cause.
6 8
The Terry rationale was extended in Adams v. Williams"9 and
Michigan v. Long.70 The Adams decision allowed an officer to stop
a vehicle, without probable cause, and for reasons not based on his
own observations. The Long decision upheld an officer's search for
weapons in the passenger compartment of an automobile, even
though the suspect was outside the car. The exigent circumstance
in these cases focused on the officer's personal security. Although
these two cases broadened Terry, the nature and scope of the de-
tention was neither lengthy nor intrusive.
In United States v. Place71 and Florida v. Royer,7 the Court
also confronted the issue of determining the reasonableness of the
68. The Court in Terry was careful to note that the manner and scope of the search
and seizure must be limited; the seizure and search must be reasonably related in scope to
the justification for their initiation. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
69. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
70. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
71. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
72. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
1986] 619
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* detention and subsequent intrusion of an individual's privacy. In
Place, the Court extended Terry by upholding the seizure of prop-
erty. Place involved luggage reasonably suspected of containing il-
legal drugs. The Court asserted, however, that only a brief and lim-
ited detention would satisfy the requirement of reasonableness.
The Court found that a ninety minute seizure of luggage was too
lengthy to qualify as a brief detention under Terry and its
progeny.
73
In Royer, the officials reasonably suspected the defendant was
transporting narcotics.7 4 The defendant was taken to a small room
at the airport for questioning, where he was detained for only fif-
teen minutes. The Court held, however, that while the initial stop
of the defendant constituted a valid Terry stop, the subsequent
detention was more intrusive than necessary to further the pur-
poses of the investigation.7 5 The Court was most precise on the
scope of permissible Terry-type detentions: "An investigative de-
tention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative
methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period
of time '76 (emphasis added). As Justice Brennan's concurrence
noted, the plurality in Royer clearly appreciated the narrow scope
of Terry and its progeny.
The scope of a Terry-type "investigative" stop and any attend-
ant search must be extremely limited or the Terry exception
would swallow the general rule, that Fourth Amendment
seizures and searches are 'reasonable' only if based on probable
cause .... Any suggestion that the Terry reasonable suspicion
standard justifies anything but the briefest of detentions or the
most limited of searches finds no support in the Terry line of
cases. 77
III. AN ANALYSIS OF DE HERNANDEZ
The general rule of probable cause would continue to exist if
73. Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10.
74. The defendant fit a drug courier profile. Royer, 460 U.S. at 493.
75. Royer, 460 U.S. at 504. The Court noted that the defendant's detention was a more
serious intrusion on his personal liberty than is allowable on mere suspicion of criminal
activity. Royer, 460 U.S. at 504.
76. Id. at 500.
77. Id. at 510-11.
[Vol. 17:3
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Brennan's concurrence in Royer were heeded in de Hernandez.7 '
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion has significantly broadened
Terry 7 9 and its progeny to a most unsavory extreme. At first
glance, respondent's initial detention seems to have satisfied
Terry's reasonable suspicion exception to probable cause. How-
ever, incommunicado detention for sixteen hours in a small room,
without permission to make a phone call, where officials continu-
ally subjected respondent to strip searches and commanded her to
defecate into a wastebasket, was not a brief and limited intrusion.
In Place,80 the Court held that ninety minutes was unreasonably
lengthy for detention of luggage. Why, then, is sixteen hours rea-
sonable for human beings? And, if a fifteen minute detention was
too intrusive in Royer,81 why is a sixteen hour detention not unrea-
sonable in de Hernandez? Surely it cannot be, as the Court sug-
gests, that "authorities must be allowed to graduate their response
to the demands of any particular situation. '82 It is for this very
reason that we have detached and neutral magistrates. Nor can it
be, as the Court also suggests, that the respondent's long, uncom-
fortable, and humiliating detention "resulted solely from the
method by which she chose to smuggle drugs into this country. '83
The concurrence implied and the dissent explicitly stated, "such
post hoc rationalizations have no place in Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence, which demands that we prevent hindsight from color-
ing the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure.""
Searches and seizures at the international border pose a spe-
cial exigency which affords the government significant leeway; our
nation has a vital interest in protecting the integrity of its borders.
The statutory latitude given to customs officials and border patrol
agents exemplifies this notion of the sacrosanctity of our nation's
boundaries. 5 This careful vigilance at our borders reflects more
than xenophobia, especially where drug smuggling is concerned.
The drug crisis in the United States, caused by the massive influx
of narcotics from Latin America, is most certainly a tangible evil.86
78. 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985).
79. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
80. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
81. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
82. de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3311 (1985).
83. Id. at 3312.
84. Id. at 3321 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976)).
85. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 482, 19 U.S.C. § 1581, 19 U.S.C. § 1582. These statutes concern
customs searches of vessels, persons, and baggage.
86. "Virtually all of the cocaine and marijuana flooding South Florida comes from
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This crisis is exacerbated by the problems of detecting body cavity
smugglers. The drug crisis and the problem of detection are facts
that do shift the pendulum of fourth amendment reasonableness in
the government's favor.
The majority emphasized the crisis in law enforcement caused
by the smuggling of narcotics, the problems in detection of alimen-
tary canal smuggling, and the necessity to maintain the integrity of
our national borders. These policy considerations strike the bal-
ance in favor of the government, and serve as a justification for a
Terry-type seizure. Once that balance has been struck, however,
and the customs officials are permitted to detain the suspect, the
scope of the detention must not last longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. The methods employed must be
"the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." 8
The purpose of the stop in de Hernandez was to prevent drugs
from coming into the country. Given this purpose, the alternatives
facing the customs officials were to: (1) allow the respondent to
pass into the interior of the country; (2) allow the respondent to
return to Colombia; (3) require the respondent to submit to an x-
ray examination; or (4) force the respondent to remain in custody
until a bowel movement confirmed or refuted their suspicions.
The first and second alternatives noted above were not feasi-
ble under the circumstances.8 8 The third alternative, proffered by
Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, would allow the customs
officials to administer an x-ray examination without prior judicial
authorization. This choice, however, is problematic because of the
health problems associated with exposure to x-rays and because of
the constitutional issues that may be raised by the imposition of
involuntary x-rays.8 9 The fourth alternative, providing for custo-
South America and the Caribbean." Drug War Failing at Home, Abroad, Miami Herald,
Dec. 8, 1985, A 10, col. 2. "Peru and Bolivia are believed to account for 92 percent of the
coca plants that eventually are smuggled into the U.S. as cocaine. Colombia is still thought
to be the shipment point for more than 80 percent of the cocaine reaching the U.S. ... Id.
at col. 3.
87. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
88. Officials did attempt to place respondent on a flight to Colombia via Mexico; how-
ever, the Mexican airline would not transport her without a Mexican visa. de Hernandez,
105 S. Ct. at 3307.
89. While Justice Stevens' alternative would certainly enhance the efficiency of de-
tecting and preventing alimentary canal smuggling, it would be prudent to await congres-
sional legislation in this area before permitting such searches.
(Vol. 17:3
MONTOYA DE HERNANDEZ
dial detention, presents the most viable solution of those sug-
gested. The de Hernandez Court, however, failed to recognize a
fifth alternative: obtaining a search warrant from a magistrate. A
simple telephonic warrant 0 would have allowed the officials to ver-
ify or dispel their suspicions soon after the initial stop, thereby
obviating any need to wait until probable cause did or did not
ripen. Allowing customs officials to hold a suspect until they can be
certain probable cause exists makes a mockery of the requirement
that a detached and neutral magistrate decide if there is sufficient
evidence for probable cause to attach.9
Even if obtaining a warrant was not feasible, and the only via-
ble alternative was to detain the suspect until she produced a
monitored bowel movement, the duration and conditions of this
detention-indefinite, incommunicado confinement-certainly ap-
proached that of an arrest. Yet, the respondent, was not afforded
any of the rights and benefits that accrue with an arrest. The re-
spondent was denied permission to use the telephone and also de-
nied legal counsel, certainly "basic amenities that would have been
provided to even the vilest of criminals."92 That a sixteen-hour in-
communicado detention is more akin to a full custodial arrest than
a brief Terry-type stop seems obvious.
The de Hernandez decision is of great practical significance
because thousands of international travelers cross our borders each
day. It is important to remember that the law applies to guilty and
innocent travelers alike. It does not require remarkable prescience
to see the practical effect of de Hernandez; many travelers could
be subjected to long, uncomfortable, and humiliating searches. The
warning from the de Hernandez Court is clear: If you are an inter-
national traveler who loosely fits a drug courier profile, the possi-
bility exists that you may be subjected to a "brief detention" like
Rosa de Hernandez. Every international traveler, especially those
coming from drug source countries in Latin America, should be
90. This simple procedure was ultimately used in de Hernandez 27 hours after the ini-
tial stop.
91. As stated in Terry:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is as-
sured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws
can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the par-
ticular circumstances.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
92. 105 S. Ct. at 3319.
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aware of the strong warning offered by the de Hernandez Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the border search area, the Ninth Circuit has struggled to
find the standard of reasonableness necessary to allow a Terry-
type detention. The Supreme Court, in turn, has struggled with
the quest of limiting the scope and duration of the intrusion once
the Terry-type stop begins. The paramount purpose of Terry is to
allow only limited intrusions into an individual's privacy, and only
when these intrusions are reasonable. A determination of reasona-
bleness derives from a balancing of the interests of government
and the individual. The reasonableness requirement, however, does
not end when the intrusion begins. The ensuing intrusion must be
reasonable at all phases, not just at inception. By subjecting
searches and seizures at all times to the reasonableness require-
ment, the fourth amendment better serves to reconcile the compet-
ing interests of government and the individual. This proscription
will also ensure that the courts do not end their inquiry once a
presumption in favor of either the government or the individual is
established.
This, then, is the problem with the de Hernandez decision.
The Court essentially ended its inquiry after it reasoned that the
balance had been struck in the government's favor, owing to the
law enforcement problems this nation faces in stanching the mas-
sive inflow of drugs at our borders. The dangerous and debilitating
effects that the massive inflow of drugs have on this country are
self-evident and alarming. The problem of preventing this inflow
through detection of smuggling is equally alarming. Understanda-
bly, these crises serve as a valid rationale for invasions of privacy.
Nevertheless, there must be times when we as a nation, through
our Supreme Court, say that these vital state interests, while in-
deed compelling, cannot be tolerated because their implementation
has crossed the threshold of reasonableness. It is at these times
when the Court must realize that there is a point at which to draw
back. Regrettably, this realization was lost in de Hernandez, much
to the detriment of innocent and guilty alike.
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